The Truth About Patent Trolls – An
Honest Look at What’s Really Happening and at Stake
By Mary Fales, April 16, 2014
There has been
lots of hoopla recently in the media about the evils of patent trolls. They
have been depicted as savage monsters devouring the U.S. economy in the form of
billions of dollars a year.[1] Anti-troll proponents don’t just stop at the
derogatory name “troll,” but label them “bottom feeders.”[2]
They accuse trolls of costing the U.S. economy “tens of billions of dollars a
year,”[3] “smothering
innovation,”[4] and
are “a real-world nightmare.”[5]
Sounds pretty horrible, but how much of this is true? By the way, what exactly
is a “patent troll?”
As one sorts
through the plethora of articles, papers, and commentary regarding trolls there
seems to be confusion. I decided to make the journey into middle earth to
observe the beasts firsthand. It turns out there is a lot more at stake than
some troll attacks. What’s really at stake is nothing less than the U.S.’s
dominance as a global intellectual property (IP) leader, but not because of
what you probably think. When it comes to patent trolls, we need to go in with
long term well thought out small changes, so we don’t jeopardize our economy
further.
Patent trolls,
first coined by Intel’s counsel Peter Detkin, [6]
are not clearly defined and come by different names: patent assertion entity (PAE)[7],
patent holding company (PHC)[8]
and non-practicing entity (NPE).[9]
Believe it or not there’s more. Consider the name “patent monetization entities
(PME),”[10]
or “patent licensing companies.”[11]
Senator McCaskill, on February 27, 2014, in a press release when introducing
her patent troll bill the, “The Transparency in Assertions of Patents Act,”
called trolls “bottom feeders.”[12]
The senator’s definition of a patent trolls is a PAE which according to her
doesn’t “produce any goods or services with their patents.”[13]
However, the senator’s definition, as
with all troll definitions, has some issues.[14]
Consider, the fact that many universities develop and patent their research but
never produce or manufacture their inventions.[15] Are they a “bottom feeder?” You can hardly
claim universities are smothering innovation. And yes; they do license and
enforce their patents.[16]
One of the more concerning troll definitions floating around in the
media is the idea that in order to be valuable in terms of sharing intellectual
information a company has to produce a product or service in order to be a
legitimate holder and asserter of their patents.[17]
But that simply isn’t true. For example, a university may have filed on IP they
didn’t commercially exploit outside of licensing.[18]
This information, via being patented, is now available to the public and other
companies will get ideas based on the universities’ disclosure. This kind of intellectual information
transfer happens all the time.[19]
Isn’t this valuable sharing of intellectual information?
What about the independent inventor?
Most people don’t realize they fit into this definition as well.[20]
For example, an individual inventor may patent their idea, but can’t afford to
manufacture or produce it. Are they a troll? What about companies that have
some products they patent and manufacture, but also have patents generated from
their R&D that they don’t manufacture. Are they half-troll, or a troll at
all? My point being, can we really separate out and distinctly define
the troll we want to target? Perhaps we
can understand what a troll is by their behavior?
Well, adding to the overall confusion,
there seems to be a spectrum of “troll behaviors” in that some behave more
socially reprehensibly than others, but all get branded “troll.” Jeff John
Robert’s of GiGaom calls Intellectual Ventures (IV), “the King Troll.”[21]
What’s interesting about IV, is the company obtains some income from filing
patent law suits, but they use the income to hire scientists and engineers to
innovate valuable intellectual property.[22]
IV’s CTO Edward Jung explains, “[o]ur whole reason to exist is to create better
ways of coming up with inventions.”[23]
It’s hard to accuse IV of smothering innovation when the opposite seems true.
Contrast IV with
the company Personal Audio who claims they own a patent that reads on podcasting.
Yes; that is correct, “podcasting!”[24]
They have recently sued a popular podcast show on the Internet “The Adam
Carolla Show."[25]
Even if Personal Audio has some products or services they patent, going after
an affordable popular social medium such as podcasting, is pretty reprehensible
troll behavior. In fact, for some reason it reminds me of an episode on The
Simpsons® when Mr. Burns blocks the sun from shining on Springfield. The truth is, not only can we not
define a target troll based on their patent holdings-commercial enterprise, but
we can’t define one very well based on behavior either. A patent licensing
company enforcing their rights as a Plaintiff will look just like Personal
Audio. It’s a difficult problem.
Nonetheless, no matter what type of “troll” we’re
talking about, in general, it is assumed a patent troll buys up patents
and sues businesses in order to gain revenue without having a service, or
product they themselves manufacture. As
one can readily imagine, there is a danger in broadly defining trolls. Depending on how you label a troll affects
the data that is being collected and distributed. What about legislation
passing bills that are “anti-troll?” Which of the trolls I described above gets
slaughtered? How we define trolls can have serious negative repercussions.
The definition of
a troll matters. It matters not only because we’re slurring valuable
respectable companies and individual contributors, but we could end up
slaughtering the “innocent” along with the real targets in legislation. The
innocent slaughter may be costly if legislators don’t get it right.[26]
It’s easy to understand articles like the one written by General Counsel Don
Rosenberg of Qualcomm, Inc. where he calls for congress to “take care to operate
with a scalpel, not a cleaver.”[27] A
troll by any other name matters.
Contrary to recent
media coverage, patent trolls have been around a while, and depending on your
definition of troll they have been around for centuries.[28]
Robert H. Resis, makes a good argument that the first patent troll was probably
Eli Whitney back in the 1790s.[29] Eli Whitney’s business had closed shop three years after
his patent issued on the cotton gin. He wasn’t able to make it a commercial
success, but he exerted his patent rights by suing plantation owners for many
years.[30]
Eli Whitney fits within the troll definition: he wasn’t able to manufacture his
invention, but gained revenue by asserting it against others. There are many
other examples in history, [31]
but it is true that troll activity has increased especially within the last
twenty years.
We’ve had many patent wars[32]
over the years that eat into millions of dollars, and to be fair, all patent litigation has increased.[33]
But what makes trolls thrive of late? It’s a result of several factors. First,
we have the American rule in that each party pays for their own legal fees and
costs. This means if a troll is suing a defendant who can’t afford the high
pre-trial costs of discovery let alone the millions of dollars to litigate,
that defendant will most likely settle –and quickly.[34] This encouragers trolls to sue, because they
know a business more often than not is going to pay the license fee rather than
go to court.[35]
Settling immediately is often the best sound business decision for many that
face going out of business.[36] Along the same rationale, contingency fees[37]
have allowed trolls to flourish. If a troll doesn’t have to risk attorney fees
unless they win, they have even more incentive to sue.[38]
Adding to the plot, trolls send out ambiguous demand letters
to “infringers.”[39]
Trolls can be prolific in the amount of letters they send. For example, one PAE
was reported to have sent 8,000 notice letters regarding its WiFi patents.[40]
It cost a lot of money just to evaluate a trolls patents and compare it to
alleged “infringement,” so businesses will want to avoid the costs of just
ascertaining if they’re actually infringing or not. In fact, ambiguity is a
weapon trolls wield often.
Trolls use the fact that many poor quality patents are
issued and have overly broad and/ or ambiguous claim boundaries.[41]
Overly broad claims pretty much grantees there are many potential infringers.[42]
This is especially true of some software and business method patents. Their
very nature tends to lend itself to overly broad claims with many “infringers.”[43]
The truth is many of these programs or methods are already in the public domain
and shouldn’t be patentable at all. It’s worth noting that Bessen in his book
Patent Failure suggests that it is the poor notice, or the overly broad poor
quality patents being asserted that leads to the increase in all patent
lawsuits, and not just that of trolls. However, trolls have certainly seen an
advantage in pursuing the patent system’s weakness.[44]
We have a good
patent system,[45]
but it’s not perfect. The USPTO has granted too many poor quality patents that
shouldn’t have been granted.[46]
This is due to several factors. The USPTO has many patent applications filed
and little time and resources to effectively examine them.[47] They
do a pretty amazing job considering the mountain of applications they’re up
against. Add to the growing mountain, the challenge of new and quickly changing
technology.[48] Plus, certain case law has made it possible
for a large number of overly broad patents to grant. For example, the Supreme
Court in Diamond v. Diehr (1981) ruled that the use of a computer program in
the rubber making process didn’t make it unpatentable. The patent office
interpreted correctly that software patents were eligible subject matter. [49]
Another famous case that opened the floodgates for all manners of broad method
claims was State Street Bank (1998) in which the Court ruled that a formula in
the form of a computer program was patentable if it produced a useful or
tangible result.[50]
Software patents have increased over the years. According to the GAO report,
“[b]y 2011 patents related to software made up more than half of all issued
patents.”[51]
What is interesting about most software patents is the very nature of
programing is not that creative.[52] A
variety of programmers will program the code the same way. Thus, if you obtain
a patent on a software program, it’s highly likely that many users would have
independently programmed the same thing.[53]
That’s one of the reasons why organizations like the League for Programming
Freedom didn’t want software to have IP protection.[54]
Other things that
have led to troll success was the Pre-AIA multiple joinder in 35 U.S.C. § 299.[55]
The joinder allowed for multiple defendants to be added to the lawsuit if a
common patent was infringed. This allowed trolls to add many defendants to a
single lawsuit which maximizes their outcome while at the same time minimizing
their costs, because they have one lawsuit to fund.[56]
Finally, we have
to understand trolls aren’t on a level playing field.[57]
Typically, when two competitors are fighting over the market with their
patents, they both have a product or service that they have patented. So if one
company sues another, usually the companies countersue, thus making the fight
if you will even.[58]
Often, this counter-sue-reality encourages companies to cross-license and
perhaps avoid lawsuits altogether.[59]
That was certainly the majority of the cases during the software patent wars of
the 1990s.[60]
In fact, obtaining patents as a defense strategy is common amongst technical
giants.[61]
Trolls however, don’t typically have a product or service and are not
vulnerable to being countersued. Since they do not produce any products, they
have very little at stake to lose from a countersuit. In fact, what
infringement are you claiming they have done at all in order to be countersued?[62]
Basically, trolls
take advantage of low risk patent lawsuits that conversely have a high rate of
payout. Trolls may be reprehensible to
some, but as a business model goes, you can hardly blame them for doing it.
Trolls: the Good, Bad, and
Unknown
Since trolls have
very little to lose by suing, and everything to gain, that makes them rather
litigious. According to the President’s Counsel of Economic Advisers, trolls
now file as many as “60% of all patent lawsuits in the US.”[63]
All these lawsuits can weigh down the court system. They’re considered
frivolous lawsuits that take precious court resources away from “legitimate”
parties.[64]
Not only do trolls cost the court system, but they cost innocent businesses
lots of money as well.[65]
Trolls can make
businesses with shallow pockets go out of business, prevent them from hiring
more people, or waste their profits with frivolous lawsuits. This money is
better used elsewhere.[66]
It’s especially, concerning to the government when the small businesses are
attacked, because they generate many jobs and pay taxes and therefore affect
the U.S. economy. Trolls are accused of doing this, without directly adding IP
benefits to society in return.[67]
Trolls who don’t
innovate, produce any goods, or service are not adding to the overall
intellectual benefits directly, and their aggressive litigation behaviors may
hinder others from wanting to innovate and operate out of fear.[68]
Broadly speaking, we allow limited monopolies to inventors, which is a cost to
society, because we receive the long-term benefit of their inventions given to
the public.[69]
So trolls who only assert patent rights, don’t directly benefit society by
innovating which is what the patent system is supposed to reward. Moreover, the
fear of being sued by a troll may discourage others from starting a company and
innovating.[70]
If you think about
it, trolls are a creative innovation in themselves. They saw an innovative way to model a
business. As a result they have created
a market for patents that normally wouldn’t exist.[71]
This market sometimes is referred to as an intermediary market[72],
secondary market, capital market for invention[73],
or patent brokerage market.[74]
Many inventors don’t have the financial means to manufacture or produce their
innovations. So trolls in a way create a market for these inventors, because
they purchase their patents. Consider the Forbes article where they draw a
compelling portrait of how a troll can help the insolvent innovator: “[p]atent
trolls are often the buyer of last resort for an inventor who cannot afford to
develop his or her invention.”[75]
In conjunction,
the benefit of an “intermediary” for the patent market, is that business who
can develop and manufacture the inventions, can save time and money by having
the intermediary find the patents they need.[76]
However, this is more along the lines of a patent broker versus a “bottom feeder”
business model.[77]
An argument can be
made that trolls encourage innovation and aren’t smothering it. For example, IV
developed “3,000” patents itself.[78]
And Robert Berman encourages inventors if they invent something, they can
“come” to him and he will help them monetize it.[79]
When we look at
the good and bad we learn we have lots of unknowns. How much of a drain are
trolls on the courts? They seem mainly to settle.[80] I’ve interviewed two patent litigators who don’t think
trolls aren’t that big of a problem, but gave the impression, they’re an
ordinary part of doing business.[81]
Also, what is unknown is just how many “mom & pops” trolls have
forced out of business. It appears that trolls mainly like to go after
companies with deep pockets. Apple has been a favorite troll meal for years
being sued by them “92 times in the past three years alone."[82]
The cost to the economy is also greatly unknown, in spite of Bessen’s
commendable attempts to put a number to it.
Finally, we really don’t know if trolls smother innovation or not.
Proposed Anti-Troll
Legislation: the Good, Bad, and Unknown
Legislators in
recent years have come up with some bills to try and address the troll
problem. In December of 2013, the house
passed Bob Goodlatte’s bill the Innovation Act.[83] Goodlatte’s
bill has some transparency requirements. Currently, many trolls hide behind
shell companies, so the bill requires plaintiffs to disclose who the owner of a
patent is before litigation.[84]
In addition, plaintiffs have to explain the specific infringement, which helps
get rid of the ambiguous demand letter being sent.[85]
Senator McCaskill’s bill which was introduced to the senate on February 2014
has similar transparency requirements[86]
Given the fact that these transparencies requirements have little downside and
produce some upside, they seem like good proposals to help deal with trolls.
Since trolls have
little to risk in suing under the American Rule, Chairman Goodlette’s bill also
has a fee-shifting component. The idea being the looser of the patent suit
would have to pay the winner’s attorney fees.
This seems like a reasonable idea given that trolls take advantage of
the American Rule and contingency fees[87]
(low risk to sue). A recent study by legal scholars John R. Allison, Mark A.
Lemley, and Joshua Walker found that 92.4 percent of merit judgments for patent
suits (once-litigated study group) were found for the defendants,[88] so
having a fee-shifting plan that shifts the fees to the defendant sounds like it
would help deter aggressive patent trolls.
At the same time,
fee-shifting creates a real problem. It is pro-defendant. Thus, it’s going to
make a legitimate plaintiff action harder to pursue and deter them from
enforcing their rights.[89]
Everyone knows that going to court is risky, because the outcome is somewhat
unpredictable. Trolls happily take on the risk, because they have little to
lose. That’s why fee-shifting is so tempting, because it adds some serious risk
to a frivolous Plaintiff. However, those “mom & pops,” facing fee-shifting,
will be a lot less likely to assert their legitimate rights against a true
infringer, because their risk has been increased.[90]
Also consider,
even with fee-shifting in place, victim-defendants most likely will not be able
to afford the costs to make it to a trial to take advantage of the fee-shift.
Some victim-defendants may be lucky to find a law firm that loans costs and
works on a contingency basis, but I think fee-shifting won’t make much of a
dent. The facts are the enormous costs of discovery alone is still going to
pressure victim-defendants to settle. In
fact, fee-shifting being pro-defendant may even make deliberate infringing more
prevalent.[91]
Along the same
lines as fee-shifting, Senator Orrin Hatch is working on a plaintiff Bond for
defendant’s legal fees.[92]
But that bond requirement has the same potential issue of discouraging
legitimate plaintiffs with small pockets from asserting their patent rights
against an infringer. They simply may not have the money to “put up a bond.”
While transparency
seems like a good idea, fee-shifting is more of an unknown. It could backfire
and have negative unforeseeable consequences.
It’s interesting to note, that we already allow for fee-shifting under
35 U.S.C. § 285. The statute allows
for fee-shifting in patent cases when the suit is brought in bad faith and
baseless, or for other misconduct during litigation. So why hasn’t that statute
made a dent already against patent trolls? It’s something that may take on more
of a role in the future.[93]
Why the Sudden Need for
“Prompt” Legislative Action?
If trolls have
been around for over twenty years, and even longer than that, why the sudden
need for “prompt legislative action?” FTC Commissioner Julie Brill calls
congress to “act expeditiously to take whatever enforcement actions are
warranted to stop inappropriate abuse.”[94]
Certainly some of the urgency is a result of the media’s bandwagon hype and
misinformation,[95]
but I think the real reasons may be closer to home than congress wants to
admit. Could it be that congress knew passing the AIA would hurt small
business?[96]
Congress Knew Passing the
AIA Would Harm Small Business
When President
Obama signed the AIA into effect on September 16, 2011, legislation was aware
that the AIA could harm small businesses[97]
In fact, a study of the AIA effects on small businesses was ordered.[98]
It’s supposed to be complete in 2016.[99] It’s worthy of theorizing that perhaps the
recent legislations call to arms on patent trolls of the last few years has
more to do with legislation’s knowledge that small businesses have already been
harmed significantly by the AIA. Patent
protection is important for small business[100]
who make up a significant part of the U.S. economy.
However, the AIA
being a “first-to-file” system has made it harder for small business without
deep pockets to pursue patent protection.
The AIA has tried to address this with their “micro-entity” filing fees,
amongst other things, but the truth is most of the patent filing costs come
from patent practitioners who draft and file the patents. Companies with deep
pockets can hire all the practitioners they want to file quickly for them, while
small business will lose out on priority dates due to lack of funds.[101]
The U.S. Economy Hasn’t
Recovered
I’m not going to
dive into the complicated discussion of U.S. economics, but it’s worth
mentioning that legislators probably feel some real pressure to protect an
economy that hasn’t fully recovered yet.[102]
If small businesses are significant to the U.S. economy and trolls are
attacking them, then of course legislators are going to want to tuck the
“newborn chicks” under their legislative wings. In other words, legislators may
be distracted by the short-term need and not considering the long term affects
enough.[103]
Hang on! Thor has Already
Been Here With his Hammer
The Market is Already
Defending Itself
Some companies
have already generated some unique ideas to battle trolls. Take for example,
IPXI an intellectual property exchange company established in 2007, that thinks
providing more transparency is part of the solution to abusive litigation
tactics.[104]
IPXI makes publically available the owners of patents that go through the
exchange. The exchange also has a committee that evaluates the value of the
patents.[105]
In 2009 company
called RPX bought up patents in part for the purpose of keeping them out of
troll hands.[106]
It’s basically a patent pool company that will allow members to use their
patents for a nominal fee, but never plans on asserting their portfolio.[107]
If enough companies did this, there wouldn’t be any patents for trolls to
purchase. The thought of preventing trolls from buying up patents is an idea
that is being explored.
Twitter™ launched their Innovator’s Patent Agreement (IPA) and
part of the purpose was to keep patents out of troll hands.[108]
The IPA is designed such that the inventor places a condition on the patent
that it can never be used for offensive purposes and the promise follows the
patent, so that no matter who gets ahold of it, the condition remains.[109]
The owner remains in control of who can assert the patent offensively, so if a
legitimate dispute arose, the patent could still be used to protect the patent
holder’s rights. The market may be able to battle trolls effectively with
creative ideas, but legislation and the courts have also placed effective
anti-troll mines.[110]
We’ve Already Put into
Action Anti-Troll Devices
We have learned from
history. Poor patent quality was the result of a lot of litigation back in the
late 1790s.[111]
Congress responded and made changes to insure only quality patents were
granted.[112]
Today, legislators recognize that high volumes of overly broad patents are a problem,
because they have enabled trolls to abuse the patent system. Partly in response
to this, legislators switched to the “first-to-file” through the AIA. Switching
to “first-to-file” has many benefits, one of which is that it will introduce
tons of new art and reduce some of the overly broad patents granted. Moreover,
Section 34 of the AIA mandated a GAO study of the consequences of NPE
litigation and provide a recommendation.[113]
That recommendation was that the USPTO’s examination process should be evaluated
to produce higher quality patents. A theme we find running through many of the
scholarly writings.[114]
In conjunction,
the AIA amended the Joinder 35 U.S.C. § 299
statute (rule 20) to help reduce the troll abuse of adding multiple defendants.[115]
The pre-AIA joinder had two prongs to it and the courts were split on how they
interpreted the statute. The minority interpreted the rule as allowing a
plaintiff to add multiple defendants to one lawsuit so long as “the defendants
had infringed the same patent.”[116]
This interpretation allowed trolls to sue multiple defendants in favorable
forums.[117]
The AIA joinder now reads that defendants can’t be joined solely on the basis
of infringing the same patent, but need to be “arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions.”[118]
In addition, the
AIA allows for a 9 month post grant challenge which will help reduce the number
of “invalid” patents.[119]
Some comments made in the media are that the AIA has failed.[120]
Wait a second; let’s get some perspective.
It has taken twenty years to create the perfect storm for trolls, and
the AIA regarding most of the patent changes, only just took effect in March
16, 2013. It will be effective, but we need to give it some more time.
Improvements aren’t going to be instantaneous. Besides the AIA, the courts in
fact have done a fairly good job of balancing the costs associated with
patents.[121]
The Supreme Court
even back in the 2006 made decisions to reign in the type of subject matter and
claims that exacerbate the troll problem.[122] In addition, the courts have been making
decisions that help victim-defendants. Take for example the case of Eon-Net LP
v. Flagstar Bancorp in 2011.[123]
Eon-Net had sued many companies where the outcome was dismissal or early
settlement. Eon-Net LP then sued Flagstar Bancorp.[124]
Ultimately, the CAFC found under 35 U.S.C. §
285 that the lawsuit was objectively baseless, filed in bad faith, and for
an improper purpose.[125]
Specifically, that "the appetite for licensing revenue cannot overpower a litigant’s
and its counsel’s obligation to file cases reasonably based in law and fact and
to litigate those cases in good faith."[126]
This decision certainly suggests that the courts can deal with patent trolls in
a fairly effective manner using 35 U.S.C. §
285.
If we’ve already
put into motion anti-troll market changes, statutes, and court decisions, then
why are we flailing around in the media as if the problem hasn’t been addressed
and the entire U.S. economy will collapse unless congress does something immediately
about it?
Why is the Troll Debate So
Convoluted?
For Starters the Data
Isn’t Accurate
There aren’t any
real facts. We’re all just guessing. Anti-troll proponents use “facts” as if
they were undisputable. These “facts” get passed from article to article like
the telephone game.[127]
Consider this “fact” from an article written by Kris Frieswick, “In 2011,
patent trolls cost U.S. companies more than $29 billion in legal fees and
settlement costs.”[128]
Compare that “fact,” to Michael Beckerman’s, “...literally. U.S. businesses paid out $29 billion to patent trolls in
2011. And when lawyer fees and other indirect costs are added in, the total
cost to the U.S. economy came to $80 billion.”[129]
However, an article written by James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, and Michael
J. Meurer state that, “[t]he mean wealth lost per lawsuit is $122 million in
2010 dollars and the median loss is $20.4 million ... These estimates are, of
course, much larger than the direct cost of legal fees.”[130]
Keep in mind that the Bessen article itself says “[t]hese findings should be
interpreted cautiously.”[131]
But many articles quote and misquote Bessen as if it were a scientific fact.
What percentage of
patent law suits are from trolls? According to the Bessen article, “In 2010,
firms operating in the United States found themselves in lawsuits initiated by
non-practicing entities (NPEs) more than 2,600 times.”[132]
Compare this to the GAO’s findings that about “2,500” patent infringement
lawsuits were filed in 2010.[133]
And that, “PMEs brought about 19 percent of the lawsuits ... and 24 percent in
2011.”[134]
That means according to the GAO, in 2011, trolls were responsible for 24% of
about 3,300 lawsuits in 2011 which equals about 790 lawsuits.[135]
Contrast that with PAE’s “in 2011” having brought “45% of all cases” which is
about “1500” lawsuits.[136]
Certainly, some of
these contradictions arise from the way the data is measured and
presented. Consider my relief to learn
that others inquiring into the troll debate came to the same conclusion. Namely
that, “there is little hard data, and much of the data that exists is mixed or
inconclusive.”[137]
Part of the inconsistencies is due to what they consider a troll. Remember
universities are a type of NPE, but are typically not considered a troll by
anti-troll proponents[138]
So depending on what you call a troll and place into the “troll bucket” will
effect the numbers.
Another reason why the data may be
skewed is that some of the agencies presenting the data and reports have a
position bias like “Patent Freedom.”[139]
As much we want
solid data, it appears difficult to obtain. I think that is why some companies
are concerned[140]
with any quick decisions regarding the troll problems. It’s a real concern that
our patent system may be significantly changed based on poor data and media hype.
The Policy Concerns aren’t
Straightforward & There’s Big Money on Both Sides of the Issue
The media, in
general, is grossly underestimating the interdependent complexity of
intellectual property issues.[141]
To be fair, both sides often give recognition to the other’s viewpoint, but end
up claiming their viewpoint is the correct one. However, both sides are tossing
discreet theories around as if they had hard core facts, and as if they can
fully explain how the IP theories intertwine with our economy.
For example, many
anti-troll proponents accuse trolls of hurting the economy. While others bring
up the fact that trolls are adding to the economy with their intermediary
markets. Trolls are probably hurting more than helping, but no one knows really
how much. Bessen et al., in their article try and address this “transfer” of
wealth[142]
However, David Schwartz and Jay Kesan in their Cornell law review critiquing
Bessen’s “data,” concluding “[w]e believe that further empirical information
... would be useful to analyze the role of NPEs in the patent system.”[143]
There are claims
that trolls are smothering innovation. However, when we look at the USPTO’s
application filing and grant numbers they show steady upward trends. For
example, 484,955 patent applications were filed and 79,526 granted in 2007.[144]
In 2010 520,277 were filed and 107,791 granted.[145]
That means around a 10% increase in filings between 2007 and 2010 and around a
30% increase in grants. In spite of all the recent NPE activity the upward
trend still continues.[146]
So then what? Are we going to debate whether patent filings are a true measure
of inventiveness.[147]
We’re told
trollish lawsuits revolve around overly broad software patents. That said, it’s interesting to learn that at
least within the smartphone wars that 80% of the software patents asserted
actually were held valid.[148] That indicates that the policy issues
regarding software patents may not be as simple as thought.[149]
Again, there is a danger in trying to over simplify a complicated issue. Just
like we’re lumping many companies into the troll bucket, we want to lump all
software patents in one bucket as well. I fully sympathize wanting to grasp the
complex issues, but this isn’t easy subject matter. Besides the data, there are
public policies at play.
Patent law policy
in itself is contentious: too many to list here. Take for example, the Supreme
Court has traditionally held an anti-monopoly[150]
stance. Anti-monopoly sounds like it will encourage competition and therefore
the economy, but when the Court began holding more patents valid and
enforceable in the 1980s the U.S.’s economy strengthened.[151]
Adding to the
confusion is big interests lobbying for their companies optimum outcome on both
sides of the debate. For example, Apple, Microsoft, and IBM all want patent
reform and anti-troll legislation, but don’t want software patents to lose any
protection.[152]
While Google wants anti-troll legislation and cross-licensing arrangements.[153]
With everything so convoluted, how can we effectively address the problem? We
need to learn more about what we don’t know meanwhile concentrating on what we
do know.
IP is Critical to the U.S.
Economy
Even before the
U.S. Constitution colonies allowed for patent monopolies in order to attract
valuable technology and resources to newly undeveloped lands.[154]
Individual States seeing the benefit of patents allowed patent monopolies in a
variety of terms and conditions before the national system under the
Constitution.[155] Since the Constitution our country has been
developing our patent system for hundreds of years. There have been turbulent times throughout,[156]
but the undisputed fact is IP is necessary for economic growth.[157]
As the U.S. trade deficit increased from labor moving offshore, in the 1980s
President Reagan’s administration fought for patent laws that would protect not
only our IP, but the IP of other countries.[158]
The courts who had been traditionally anti-monopoly began upholding patents in
court.[159]
The U.S. emerged as global IP leader. In the mid 1990s the U.S. IP exports were
well over 50% of all U.S. exports.[160] In 2012, using only IP royalties and license
fees, it was estimated that the U.S. exported $120.8 billion.[161]
Without the financial incentives of being able to obtain patents, most
companies and individuals would not invest their time and money into
innovation.[162] The U.S. economic power is rooted firmly in
IP. “IP-intensive industries accounted for about $5.06 trillion in value added,
or 34.8 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), in 2010.”[163]
We need to protect our IP system in order to maintain our economy, and we need
to make sure that going after an annoyance like trolls won’t jeopardize it,
because a lot is at stake.
The Supreme Court Opened the Software Patent Doors
and Can Close Them
I’m not arrogant
enough to claim to be able to read The Supreme Court Justice’s minds, but it
doesn’t take much thought to realize trolls may be a consideration in regards
to Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International.[164]
The strong relationship between software patents and trolls can’t be
overlooked. Let’s face it, the facts are trolls acquire software and business
method patents, because they lend themselves to being broad and infringed by
many users. Software patents increased as a result of Diamond v. Dierh. Other
countries that have stricter patent laws regarding software like India and
Japan, don’t seem to have much of a Troll problem at all.[165]
In fact, India’s 2005 Patent Act greatly reduced the amount of troll issues
they were having.[166]
Plus, it’s not the first time the Court has made efforts to reign in the overly
broad patents that have a high social cost.[167]
This is what the court does well according to Cass & Hylton.[168] It
seems reasonable the Supreme Court could be reconsidering their previous
decision on allowing software patents to be patent eligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The issues
surrounding software patents are complicated. Many large companies that heavily
support the U.S. economy rely on them.[169]
However, they have been controversial and many think they should never have
been patentable subject matter in the first place.[170] The
truth is we have them now, companies have invested and become dependent on
them, and taking away their protection completely under 35 U.S.C. § 101 seems catastrophic. It’s like
thinking we can pluck Mercury out of our solar system and nothing negative will
result. More is at stake than troll attacks. What’s at stake is the U.S.
economy itself. We’ve put into action safe
anti-troll changes, but we need to give them time to work.
Trolls, are a
problem, but the truth is no one knows just how big of a problem they are. We
need more accurate data and well reasoned educated thought to address them. We’ve
already moved to good places for the long run with AIA, the market, and court
support. We just need to give these measures time to work. Let’s not harm the
U.S.’s economy and global IP leadership by trying to swat away some trolls. If
we make hasty decisions, we could be in a lot more trouble than we are today.
[1] James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent
Trolls, 34 Regulation 26, 26
(2012).
[2] Jessica M. Karmasek, McCaskill Introduces Own Legislation Aimed
at ‘Bottom-Feeder’ Patent Trolls, The
Southeast Texas’ Legal Journal, March 5, 2014,
http://setexasrecord.com/news/294666-mccaskill-introduces-own-legislation-aimed-at-bottom-feeder-patent-trolls
(Last Visited Apr. 14, 2014).
[3]Id.
[4] John Kelly, Are Patent
Trolls Smothering Innovation, How Stuff
Works (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/everyday-innovations/patent-trolls2.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014)(Re: George B. Sheldon’s gasoline-engine-driven
carriage).
[5] George LeVines, As Coakley Ramps up Patent Troll Fight, LevelUp says it has spent $1m
Dealing with Claims, BetaBoston
(Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.boston.com/business/innovation/blogs/inside-the-hive/2013/11/06/bdc-blogtroll/kyYKQdIxJ7I2fzoIKegOgN/blog.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[6] Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limited Joinder, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 673, 676 (2012).
[7] Press Release, Senator McCaskill, McCaskill Introduces Bill to Crack Down on
Patent Trolls (Feb. 27, 2014), available
at http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=12097.
[8] Amir Efrati, Patent-Holding Company (A Troll?) Stung By Own Litigation, Wall St.
J. (Aug. 20, 2007),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/08/20/patent-holding-company-a-troll-stung-by-own-litigation/
(last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
[9] Rob Goodier, Patent Trolls: How Bad is the Problem, Popular Mechanics (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/news/patent-trolls-how-bad-is-the-problem
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[10] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
GAO-13-465, Intellectual Property:
Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve
Patent Quality 2 (2013).
[11] Adam Mossoff, The Myth of the ‘Patent Troll’ Litigation Explosion, Truth on the Market (2013),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2013/08/12/the-myth-of-the-patent-troll-litigation-explosion/(Last
Visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[12] Press Release, Senator McCaskill, McCaskill Introduces Bill to Crack Down on
Patent Trolls (Feb. 27, 2014), available
at http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=12097.
[13] Jessica M. Karmasek, McCaskill Introduces Own Legislation Aimed
at ‘Bottom-Feeder’ Patent Trolls, The
Southeast Texas’ Legal Journal, March 5, 2014,
http://setexasrecord.com/news/294666-mccaskill-introduces-own-legislation-aimed-at-bottom-feeder-patent-trolls
(Last Visited Apr. 14, 2014).
[14] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
GAO-13-465, Intellectual Property:
Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve
Patent Quality 19 (2013).
[15] David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 Cornell
L. Rev. 425, 429 (2014).
[16] Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tension Between Universities and Patents and
How to Fix Them, 15 Yale J.L. &
Tech. 312 (2013); See Duke’s
Office of Licensing and Ventures, http://olv.duke.edu/index (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[17] Press Release, Senator McCaskill, McCaskill Introduces Bill to Crack Down on
Patent Trolls (Feb. 27, 2014), available
at http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=12097
[18] Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tension Between Universities and Patents and
How to Fix Them, 15 Yale J.L. &
Tech. 312 (2013); See Duke’s
Office of Licensing and Ventures, http://olv.duke.edu/index (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[19] Commercializing
Expired Patents, Al Patents, http://www.aipatents.com/commercializing-expired-patents/
(last visted Apr. 16, 2014).
[20] David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 Cornell
L. Rev. 425, 430 (2014).
[21] Jeff John
Roberts, Google to Meet Patent Troll King
Intellectual Ventures in Court, Gigaom
(Jan. 20, 2014),
http://gigaom.com/2014/01/20/google-to-meet-patent-troll-king-intellectual-ventures-in-court/.
[22] Intellectual
Ventures, http://www.intellectualventures.com (last visited Apr. 16,
2014).
[23] Jason Pontin, Q&A: Edward Jung: The CTO of Intellectual Ventures believes we Need a new Model
of Innovation to Solve our Biggest Problems, MIT
Tech Review (Dec. 22, 2011),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/426466/qa-edward-jung/.
[24] Can
Adam Carolla Defeat a Patent Troll and Save Podcasting?, Daily Finance (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/on/adam-carolla-patent-troll-podcasting-lawsuit-stakes/.
[25] Can
Adam Carolla Defeat a Patent Troll and Save Podcasting?, Daily Finance (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/on/adam-carolla-patent-troll-podcasting-lawsuit-stakes/.
[26] http://www.savetheinventor.com
[27] Don Rosenberg, First Rule of Patent Reform: Do No Harm, Wall St. J. (Sept. 10, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324432404579053633559235404.
[28] Robert H. Resis, History
of the Patent Troll and Lessons Learned, 17 Intellectual
Property Litigation (Winter 2006), available
at http://www.bannerwitcoff.com/_docs/library/articles/HistoryOfPatentTroll.pdf.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] John Kelly, Are
Patent Trolls Smothering Innovation, How
Stuff Works (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/everyday-innovations/patent-trolls2.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014)(Re: George B. Sheldon’s gasoline-engine-driven
carriage).
[32] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (1994).
[33] James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure 129 (2008).
[34] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 7 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[35] Stefania Fusco, Markets and Patent Enforcement: A Comparative Investigation of
Non-Practicing Entities in the Us and Europe (unpublished) 101, 108 (Mar.
8, 2013), (on file with Stanford) available
at
https://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/patent-trolls-a-comparative-investigation-of-non-practicin.
[36] Kris Frieswick, The Troll Toll, Inc.
59 (Feb. 2013), http://www.krisfrieswick.com/Files/inc_0213.pdf (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014).
[37] William R. Towns, U.S. Contingency Fees: A Level Playing Field?, WIPO Magazine (Feb. 2010),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/01/article_0002.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014).
[38] James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure 17 (2008).
[39] Kris Frieswick, The Troll Toll, Inc.
59 (Feb. 2013), http://www.krisfrieswick.com/Files/inc_0213.pdf (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014).
[40] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 6 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[41] James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure (2008).
[42] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars 166-172 (1994).
[43] Id.
[44] James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure 3, 17, 160 (2008).
[45] Jeffrey Kluger, The Spark of Invention, Time
84,89 (Nov. 25, 2013).
[46] James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure (2008).
[47] John Kelly, Are
Patent Trolls Smothering Innovation, How
Stuff Works (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/everyday-innovations/patent-trolls2.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[48] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars 52-54 (1994).
[49] Id.
at 161-162.
[50] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
GAO-13-465, Intellectual Property:
Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve
Patent Quality 13 (2013).
[51] Id.
[52] see Warshofsky, supra note 49, at 166.
[53] Id.
[54] Id.
at 172.
[55] Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limited Joinder, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 673, 682 (2012).
[56] Id.
at 675.
[57] Rob Goodier, Patent Trolls: How Bad is the Problem, Popular Mechanics (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/news/patent-trolls-how-bad-is-the-problem
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[58] Id.
[59] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 5 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[60] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars 170 (1994).
[61] Id.
at 171.
[62] John Kelly, Are
Patent Trolls Smothering Innovation, How
Stuff Works (Apr. 15, 2014), http://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/everyday-innovations/patent-trolls2.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Rob Goodier, Patent Trolls: How Bad is the Problem, Popular Mechanics (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/news/patent-trolls-how-bad-is-the-problem
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[63] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 12 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[64] Dennis Crouch, Further Thoughts on Fee-Shifting From Judges Rader and O’Malley, Patently-O (Dec. 28, 2013),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/12/further-thoughts-on-fee-shifting-from-judges-rader-and-omalley.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[65] James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent
Trolls, 34 Regulation 26, 26
(2012).
[66] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 7 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[67] James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent
Trolls, 34 Regulation 26, 31
(2012).
[68] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 2 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[69] Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Laws of Creation, 7 (2013).
[70] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers, the
Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent
assertion and U.S. innovation 2 (2013), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[71] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 3 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[72] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 3 (2013), available at
[73] John Kelly, Are
Patent Trolls Smothering Innovation, How
Stuff Works (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/everyday-innovations/patent-trolls2.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[74] Id.
[75] Contributor, Capital Flows (Avik Roy, ed.), Thank Heaven for Those Patent Trolls, Forbes (Nov. 24, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/01/24/thank-heavens-for-those-patent-trolls/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[76] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 3 (2013).
[77] Id.
[78] Jason Pontin, Q&A: Edward Jung: The CTO of Intellectual Ventures believes we Need a new Model
of Innovation to Solve our Biggest Problems, MIT
Tech Review (Dec. 22, 2011),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/426466/qa-edward-jung/ (last visited Apr.
15, 2014).
[79] Katy Bachman, Confessions of a Patent Troll, ADWEEK
(July 22, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/confessions-patent-troll-151324
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[80] Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limited Joinder, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 673, 679 (2012).
[81] Anonymous, Sr. Patent Litigator, in San Diego, Cal.
(Mar. 21 2014); Anonymous, Patent Litigator,
Partner, in San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 22, 2014).
[82] Joe Mullin, Apple: We’re the patent
trolls’ top target, facing 92 lawsuits in 3 years, ars technica (Feb. 9, 2014),
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(last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
[83] Press Release, Rep. Bob Goodlatte, House Passes Innovation Act To Make Reforms To
Our Patent System (Dec. 5, 2013), available
at http://goodlatte.house.gov/press_releases/476.
[84] Id.
[85] Id.
[86] Press Release, Senator McCaskill, McCaskill Introduces Bill to Crack Down on
Patent Trolls (Feb. 27, 2014), available
at http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=12097.
[87] William R. Towns, U.S. Contingency Fees: A Level Playing Field?, WIPO Magazine (Feb. 2010),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/01/article_0002.html.
[88] John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat
Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J.
677 (2011).
[89] David Ranii, News & Observer: Some Fear Proposed Patent Legislation Could Hurt
Inventors, Innovation Alliance
(Apr. 5, 2014),
http:/innovationalliance.net/patent-news/news-observer-fear-proposed-patent-legislation-hurt-inventors-david-ranii/
(last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
[90] (Contributor), The Goodlatte Act: Not Anti-Troll, But Very Definitely Anti-Plaintiff,
Intellectual Asset Management 4,
4-7 (Feb. 2014).
[91] Id.
at 4.
[92] Kate Tummarello & Julian Hattem, This Week in Tech: Senate to mark up ‘patent
troll’ bill, The Hill (Apr.
07, 2014),
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/202789-this-week-in-tech-senate-to-mark-up-patent-troll-bill
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
[93] Dennis Crouch, Further Thoughts on Fee-Shifting From Judges Rader and O’Malley, Patently-O (Dec. 28, 2013),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/12/further-thoughts-on-fee-shifting-from-judges-rader-and-omalley.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[94] (Contributor), AAI Urges Speedy Action Against Abusive Patent Trolls, The American Antitrust Institute (Feb.
06 2014),
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(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[95] Adam Mossoff, The Myth of the ‘Patent Troll’ Litigation Explosion, Truth on the Market (2013),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2013/08/12/the-myth-of-the-patent-troll-litigation-explosion/(last
visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[96] Justine Wong, CWSL 3L student, Seminar
on IP and Technology, CWSL Spring, 2014, Student Presentation, How the America Invents Act Harms Small
Businesses (Mar. 26, 2014).
[97] Id.
[98] (Contributor), Effects of First-to-File on Small Businesses, America Invents Act, http://www.aiarulemaking.com/aia-studies-reports/effects-first-file-small-business.php
(last visited on Apr. 15, 2014).
[99] Id.
[100] USPTO, International
Patent Protection for Small Businesses, (2012), available at http://www.aiarulemaking.com/media/documents/international-protection-for-small-businesses-report-to-congress.pdf.
[101] Daniel Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswalld, The Changing Face of US Patent Law and Its
Impact on Business Strategy, 70-72 (2013).
[102] Andre Kohut, Resurgent Public Optimism On The Economy? Don’t Hold Your Breath, Pew Research Center (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/17/resurgent-public-optimism-on-the-economy-dont-hold-your-breath/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[103] David J. Kappos, Investing in America’s Future Through Innovation: How the Debate Over
the Smart Phone Patent Wars (Re)Raises Issues at the Foundation of Long-Term
Incentive Systems, 16 Stan.Tech. L.
Rev. 485 (2013).
[104] Ian McClure, A Market-Based Alternative to Patent System Challenges, WIPO (Feb. 2014), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2014/01/article_0005.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[105] Id.
[106] Saul Hansell, Trolling for Patents to Fight Patent Trolls, The N. Y. Times (Mar. 30, 2009),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/trolling-for-patents-to-fight-patent-trolls/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[107] Id.
[108] Daniel Nazer, Twitter Launches Innovator’s Patent Agreement, Electronic Frontier Foundation (May 21,
2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/twitter-launches-innovators-patent-agreement
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[109]
Id.
[110] Id.
[111] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars, 47 (1994).
[112] Id.
at 48.
[113] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
GAO-13-465, Intellectual Property:
Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve
Patent Quality 13 (2013).
[114] James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure (2008).
[115] Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limited Joinder, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 673, 683 (2012).
[116] Id.
[117] Id.
[118] Id.
[119] David J. Kappos, Investing in America’s Future Through Innovation: How the Debate Over
the Smart Phone Patent Wars (Re)Raises Issues at the Foundation of Long-Term
Incentive Systems, 16 Stan. Tech. L.
Rev. 485, 494 (2013).
[120] Scott A. McKeown, AIA Post Grant Proceedings Begin To Impact NPE Assertions, Patents
Post-Grant (Dec. 27, 2012),
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2012/12/aia-patentability-proceedings-shut-down-npe (Apr. 15, 2014).
[121] Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Laws of Creation, 173, 209-221 (2013).
[122] Id.
at 162-163.
[123] Jason Rantanen, Eon-Net v. Flagstar Bancorp: Exceptional Case After Remand, Patently-O (Aug. 3, 2011),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/08/eon-net-v-flagstar-bancorp-attorneys-fees-after-remand.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[124] Id.
[125] Id.
[126] John Kelly, Are
Patent Trolls Smothering Innovation, How
Stuff Works (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/everyday-innovations/patent-trolls2.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[127] The telephone game is played by a person
whispering a message into another’s ear, this person then whispers what they
heard into the next person’s ear, and so on until the last person repeats the
message out loud. The end message never represents the original.
[128] Kris Frieswick, The Troll Toll, Inc.
59 (Feb. 2013), http://www.krisfrieswick.com/Files/inc_0213.pdf (last visited Apr.
15, 2014).
[129] Michael Beckerman, Patent Trolls Damage Innovation
Here And Across The Country, The
Day (Sept. 22 2013),
http://www.shorepublishing.com/article/20130922/OP05/309229962/-1/op (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[130] James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent
Trolls, 34 Regulation 26, 31
(2012).
[131] Id.
[132] Id.
[133] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
GAO-13-465, Intellectual Property:
Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve
Patent Quality 14 (2013) (see Fig. 2).
[134] Id.
at 17.
[135] Id.
at 14, 17.
[136] President’s Couns. Of Econ. Advisers,
the Nat’l Econ. Couns., and the Off. Of Sci. & Tech., Patent assertion and U.S. innovation 5 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
[137] David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 Cornell
L. Rev. 425, 427 (2014).
[138] Id.
at 426, 429.
[139] Adam Mossoff, The
Myth of the ‘Patent Troll’ Litigation Explosion, Truth on the Market (2013),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2013/08/12/the-myth-of-the-patent-troll-litigation-explosion/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[140] Don Rosenberg, First Rule of Patent Reform: Do No Harm, Wall St. J. (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324432404579053633559235404.
[141] Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Laws of Creation, 7 (2013) (authors try
and explain complicated IP concepts with simplified cost/ benefit economical
viewpoints).
[142] James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent
Trolls, 34 Regulation 26, 32
(2012).
[143] David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 Cornell
L. Rev. 425, 450 (2014).
[144] USPTO PTMT, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart
Calendar Years 1963-2013, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.
[145] Id.
[146] Id.
[147] Prof. Brown H. Hall, University of Ca.
Berkeley, Using Patent Data as Indicators,
(June 2013), available at
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH13_using_patent_data.pdf.
[148] David J. Kappos, Investing in America’s Future Through Innovation: How the Debate Over
the Smart Phone Patent Wars (Re)Raises Issues at the Foundation of Long-Term Incentive
Systems, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.
485, 488 (2013).
[149] Stefania Fusco, Markets and Patent Enforcement: A Comparative Investigation of
Non-Practicing Entities in the Us and Europe (unpublished) 101, 108 (Mar.
8, 2013), (on file with Stanford) available
at
https://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/patent-trolls-a-comparative-investigation-of-non-practicin.
[150] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars, 8 (1994).
[151] Id.
at 261.
[152] Dustin Volz, IBM, Microsoft, and Friends Renew Fight Against Patent-Troll Measure,
National Journal (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/technology/ibm-microsoft-and-friends-renew-fight-against-patent-troll-measure-20140130
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[153] Matthew Bye, It’s time to take action against patent trolls and patent privateering,
Google (Apr. 5, 2013),
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2013/04/its-time-to-take-action-against-patent.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[154] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars, 32 (1994).
[155] Id.
at 35.
[156] Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials
7-13 (3d ed. 2002).
[157] Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Laws of Creation, 46 (2013); Fred
Warshofsky, The Patent Wars, 1-30
(1994); CLIP, The Impact of the
Acquisition and use of Patents on the Smartphone Industry (Dec. 13,
2012).
[158] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars, 7 (1994).
[159] Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials
7-13 (3d ed. 2002).
[160] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars, 7 (1994).
[161] Kimberly Amadeo, The U.S. Trade Deficit, About.com
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://useconomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/Trade_Deficit.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[162] Don Rosenberg, First Rule of Patent Reform: Do No Harm, Wall St. J. (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324432404579053633559235404.
[163] Econ. And Statistics Administration
& USPTO, Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: Industries in Focus
(Mar. 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf.
[164] Supreme
Court of the united States, www.supremecourt.gov (last visited Apr. 15,
2014) (docket No. 13-298).
[165] Lisa Mueller, Patent Trolls: A Global Perspective, Bric Wall (Feb. 16, 2014),
http://bricwallblog.wordpress.com/2014/02/16/patent-trolls-a-global-perspective/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
[166] Id.
[167] See Bilski et al v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
(2010)
[168] Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Laws of Creation, 46 (2013); Fred Warshofsky,
The Patent Wars, 1-30 (1994);
CLIP, The Impact of the Acquisition and
use of Patents on the Smartphone Industry (Dec. 13, 2012).
[169] Dustin Volz, IBM, Microsoft, and Friends Renew Fight Against Patent-Troll Measure,
National Journal (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/technology/ibm-microsoft-and-friends-renew-fight-against-patent-troll-measure-20140130
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Don Rosenberg, First Rule of Patent Reform: Do No Harm, Wall St. J. (Sept. 10, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324432404579053633559235404.
[170] Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars 172 (1994) (predicting in 1995 the troll
issues we currently face now).